Reserve requirements and the discount window in recent decades by Ann-Marie Meulendyke
Reserve Requirements and 
the Discount Window in 
Recent Decades 
by Ann-Marie Meulendyke 
Most  students  of money  and  banking in the United 
States would identify open market operations, reserve 
requirements, and the discount rate as the basic tools 
of monetary policy. They would add that open market 
operations are the primary, most actively employed  tool 
because of their flexibility and ease of use. Nonethe- 
less, the other tools also play vital supportive roles in 
the policy process. 
The  historical roles of open market operations in the 
conduct  of monetary policy were examined in  some 
detail in an earlier article by the author.' This article 
provides  parallel treatment for reserve requirements 
and the discount window. Both articles focus on the 
years since the 1951 Treasury-Federal  Reserve  Accord, 
an agreement that freed the Federal Reserve from the 
obligation to peg interest rates on U.S. Treasury debt 
and  enabled  it to resume an  independent monetary 
policy. 
Review of open market procedures 
Because of the interrelationships  among the policy 
tools, it may be helpful to  summarize the earlier article's 
findings on open market operations before beginning 
the review of reserve requirements and the discount 
window. Since  the Accord, the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) has used various money and credit 
measures, as well as assessments of the underlying 
economic and price picture, as intermediate objectives 
'Ann.Marie Meulendyke. "A Review of Federal Reserve  Policy Targets 
and Operating Guides in Recent Decades.  Intermediate Targets 
and Indicators for Monetary Policy: A Critical  Survey. Federal 
Reserve  Bank of New York, July  1990.  PP. 452-73. Reprinted from 
this Review  vol. 13.  no. 3 (Autumn 1988), pp. 6-17. 
to guide  the settings of its operating  instruments. 
Reserve  measures  and interest rates have alternated as 
the FOMC's primary guide for day-to-day operations. 
In the first two decades after the Accord, the Trading 
Desk at the New York Federal Reserve Bank carried out 
the FOMC's instructions for achieving the desired aver- 
age behavior of various measures of bank credit. Oper- 
ating decisions were keyed to free reserves—reserves 
in  excess of those  needed to meet reserve require- 
ments less reserves borrowed  at the  discount window— 
and to the tone and feel of the money markets. By the 
1970s,  the monetary aggregates had  replaced credit 
measures as intermediate targets and the day-to-day 
emphasis shifted toward controlling the overnight inter- 
bank rate, called the federal funds rate. 
During the 1970s, adjustments to the federal funds 
rate were generally small,  and at times there was a 
reluctance to make necessary increases in the rate. 
Partly as a result, money growth persistently exceeded 
its targets, and inflationary pressures reached clearly 
unacceptable levels by the latter part of the decade. In 
1979, the FOMC  changed its approach to policy. Under 
the new procedures, it targeted levels of nonborrowed 
reserves, a measure that was closely linked  through 
reserve requirement ratios to desired growth rates of a 
narrowly defined measure of money, Ml. In addition, it 
allowed the federal funds rate to move over a much 
wider  range than before to increase the likelihood that 
money growth would be brought under control. Although 
these procedures contributed to increased fluctuations 
in both money and interest rates, they did help to bring 
down average money growth and inflation. 
At the same time,  however,  the creation of money 
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making Ml  a less reliable guide to future behavior of 
economic activity and prices. Consequently,  the FOMC 
moved away from  these  procedures late in  1982. It 
adopted a borrowed reserve procedure in 1983  that 
resembled the free  reserve technique of  the 1960s. The 
degree of reserve pressure—defined as the volume of 
reserves that banks as a group were forced to borrow at 
the discount window—was adjusted judgmentally when 
developments in the economy, money, or prices sug- 
gested that a change was appropriate. Over time, the 
borrowing relationship that underpinned this approach 
has become less dependable. Consequently, the Desk 
has once again come to rely more closely on  the behav- 
ior of the federal funds rate, although the rate has not 
become a formal target. 
Reserve requirements 
This section  reviews  the various roles of reserve 
requirements in the monetary policy  process. It 
describes how the monetary authorities, charged with 
determining  appropriate  reserve  requirements,  have 
responded to the  distinct  and  sometimes conflicting 
interests of the Federal Reserve, the banks, and the 
Treasury. 
Particular attention is given to the different  parties' 
views of the optimal level of reserve requirements. His- 
torically,  banks have sought to  minimize  reserve 
requirements. Because the reserves that banks must 
hold against their deposits  do not pay  interest, the 
requirements act as an implicit  tax on deposit creation. 
By contrast, the Treasury  has sometimes  resisted 
efforts  to lower requirements  because reserves provide 
it with an indirect source of revenue. 
The Federal Reserve, approaching the issue from a 
somewhat different perspective than either the  Treasury 
or the banks, has viewed requirements  as a  mechanism 
that can help to stabilize the demand for reserves. It 
has sought to make them high enough to promote that 
stability but low enough to minimize the distortions in 
resource allocation that inevitably accompany any tax. 
The Board's most recent cuts in requirements were 
intended to reduce the implicit tax on banking. The 
lowered requirements reduced the effective tax to less 
than $1 billion (see box). The  change helped deposito- 
ries improve ,earnings and deal more effectively with 
both strains  on their capital and dramatically increased 
insurance premia. But while these effects were bene- 
ficial, the recent reductions also brought required 
reserves  to levels  that no longer met many  banks' 
reserve needs for clearing purposes. Consequently,  the 
total demand for reserves became more difficult to pre- 
dict, and the use of open market operations became 
more complicated. 
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The history of reserve requirements since the 1951 
Accord  encompasses  numerous regulatory  changes 
and legislative initiatives that dealt with these conflict- 
ing interests.  Effective  required  reserve ratios have 
been cut substantially on balance over the years, both 
to reduce the distorting impact of the implicit  tax on the 
behavior of banks and their customers and to change 
reserve pressures. Required reserve levels since the 
Accord are shown in Chart  1.  Required reserve bal- 
ances at the Federal Reserve are currently very similar 
in level to those of  the early 1950s  despite the massive 
growth in deposits over the intervening decades. 
The roles of reserve requirements 
Over the years, analysts have attributed several differ- 
ent roles to reserve requirements in the policy process. 
The literature since World War II has most commonly 
cited two—money control  and revenues for the Trea- 
sury.2 Reserve  requirements  could affect the process of 
monetary control both by their existence and through 
changes in the mandated ratios of reserves to  deposits. 
The existence of requirements  increases the stability  in 
the banking system's demand for reserves. It also pro- 
vides the linkage that allows changes in reserve levels, 
accomplished  through open market operations, to 
encourage a change in monetary deposits. In theory, in 
a system where required reserves are a specified frac- 
tion of deposits, an increase in the amount of reserves 
provided to the banking system should be associated 
with an increase in reservable deposits in an amount 
that is a  multiple of  the reserve  increase. The  size of the 
multiple would be the inverse of the required reserve 
ratio, as in the classic textbook reserve multiplier pro- 
cess. In practice, the relationships linking reserves and 
deposits are far from precise, partly because not all 
deposits are subject to the same reserve requirement 
ratios and partly because excess and borrowed reserve 
levels can vary. 
The primary direction  of causality  linking  deposits 
and reserves will depend upon the Federal Reserve's 
guidelines for reserve provision. Regardless of its oper- 
ating procedures, the Fed has found the existence of 
reserve requirements to be a  valuable tool of monetary 
policy because of its contribution to creating a stable 
demand for  reserves.3 A number  of observers  have 
argued  that reserve  requirements  are not essential 
2See Marvin 000dtriend  and Monica Hargraves. A Historical 
Assessment of the Rationales and Functions of Reserve 
Requirements."  Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Review, March- 
April 1983. for an excellent review of  the rationales for reserve 
requirements. 
3Gordon  H. Sellon. Jr., discusses this issue in "The Instruments of 
Monetary Policy.'  Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas  City Economic 
Review.  May 1984, pp. 3-20. because banks would demand reserves in any case to 
settle transactions with other banks and to avoid over- 
drafts.4 Many  Federal  Reserve commentators  have 
rejected this claim,  contending that the voluntary 
demand for reserves would probably not be stable in 
the absence of requirements because the banks would 
always be  trying to minimize excess reserves but  would 
have varying degrees of success depending on each 
4For examples, see Deane Carson, "Is the Federal Reserve  System 
Really Necessary?" Journal of  Finance, vol. 19. no. 4 (December 
1964). PP. 652-61; and Robert E. Hall, "A  Free Market Policy to 
Stabilize the Purchasing Power of the Dollar," in Barry Seigel, ed., 
Money in Crisis: The Federal Reserve.  The Economy, and Monetary 
Reform, Pacific Studies in Public Policy (Cambridge. Massachusetts: 
Ballinger, 1984), pp. 303-21. Thomas Mayer,  Monetary Policy in the 
United Slates (New York: Random House, 1968), pp. 39-43, 
discusses the theoretical arguments against requirements  but 
concludes that they are useful, giving  reasons  similar to those cited 
in the text. 
Box 
period's reserve flows.5 
The  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys- 
tem  may also  change  reserve requirement ratios to 
influence monetary  policy. To force  a contraction  in 
deposits, the Board can raise requirements; to encour- 
age  more expansion, it can  lower  requirements. 
Although such measures may accomplish  desired 
adjustments in reserve availability, they tend to be a 
blunt instrument, not well suited to fine tuning.  The 
Federal Reserve discovered that problem in the 1930s, 
when  legislation  first gave  it the  power to change 
reserve requirements. In recent decades, it has gener- 
ally used open market operations to cushion the imme- 
Richard D. Porter and Kenneth J. Kopecky, "The Rote of Reserve 
Requirements  as a Public Policy Tool," Conference on Reserve 
Requirements  and the Role of  the Federal Reserve  System. 
Washington,  D.C., January 18-19, 1979. 
The  effective tax  on reserve requirements  is sensitive to 
the level of both required reserves and interest rates. 
Consequently,  the tax has been subject to substantial 
variation over time. 
•  The tax can be measured as reserves  times the inter- 
est forgone on those  reserves. The best interest rate to 
use is the federal funds rate less any interest paid on 
reserves (zero in the United States). Determination  of  the 
appropriate reserve measure is less straightforward. It 
•  probably makes the most sense to include only those 
reserves that would not be held if reserve requirements 
did not exist. Vault cash is held primarily for general 
business purposes rather than to meet reserve require- 
ments, and should therefore probably be excluded. On 
these grounds, some portion of  reserve balances should 
also be excluded since they are held to settle transac- 
tions  with other banks. It  is hard to know where to  draw 
the line on  what to  exclude, however, so rough estimates 
of the  tax have been made using the full amount of 
required reserve balances at  the Federal  Reserve. (June 
figures  were used  for selected  years since reserve 
requirements  are seasonally high in December.)  As the 
following table indicates, the "real" tax has varied con- 
siderably from 1951 to  the present but shows a dramatic 
net decline since 1981. 
1951  18,480  1.50 
1961  15,960  1.73 
1971  24,660  4.91 
1981  26,290  19.10 
1984  19,440  11.06 
1990  .33,100  8.29 
•  1991  22,680  5.90 
1992  20,310  3.76 
tDeflated by  the CPI for  all urban consumers, all items. 
For 1951, the rate shown is  the  three-month  new Treasury  bitt rate. 
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Estimates of the Cost of Reserve Balances 
(In Millions of Dollars) 
Date  AR balances  Fed funds rate  "Tax"  Tax in current dotlarst 
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760 diate impact of a reserve requirement  change. 
Analysts  since the Second  World  War have  also 
focused on  the role of reserve requirements in providing 
revenues to the Treasury through the implicit tax on 
deposit creation. Required reserves on which no inter- 
est is  paid reduce bank earnings—at least to the extent 
that the level of reserves exceeds what banks would 
hold  voluntarily. They enhance the revenues of the Fed- 
eral Reserve because the Fed buys interest-bearing 
Treasury debt when it supplies the reserves. The  Trea- 
sury benefits  because the  Federal Reserve turns its 
profits over to the Treasury. How burdensome a given 
level  of requirements will be for  banks depends on 
several factors, but especially on the level of nominal 
interest  rates:  the higher the rates,  the greater the 
earnings forgone. Mindful of the tax effects of increas- 
ing reserve requirement  ratios, the Federal Reserve  has 
often turned to other tools when it wanted to tighten 
policy. 
Policy  responses to conflicts between Treasury 
revenues and money control 
Federal  Reserve and government policies toward 
reserve  requirements from  the end  of World War  II 
through 1980 were significantly influenced by ongoing 
strains arising from the different reserve objectives of 
the government, the Federal Reserve, and the banks. 
Membership in the Federal Reserve was voluntary for 
state-chartered banks, so  they could escape the 
reserve tax  by dropping their membership.  (State 
requirements  were lower and generally could be met by 
maintaining balances at  other  banks, for which services 
were  provided,  and  sometimes  by holding  Treasury 
bills, which paid interest.) The Federal Reserve wanted 
reserve requirements to  be  broad  based enough  to 
facilitate money control.6 The Fed believed that reserve 
requirements could  be  set in a way that  would 
strengthen the linkages between reserves and money 
and between  reserves and  short-term  interest  rates. 
The existing structure encouraged departures from  Fed- 
eral  Reserve membership that weakened those 
linkages. 
The Federal Reserve proposed two solutions to this 
conflict  during the 1970s. First, it called for universal 
membership so that all banks would be subject  to the 
6G. William Miller, "Proposals on Financial Institution Reserve 
Requirements  and Related Issues," testimony before the House 
Committee  on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, July 27, 1978. 
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90  92 Fed's reserve requirements. Second, it proposed paying 
interest on required reserves to offset the banks' reve- 
nue  loss  and  to make  membership in the Federal 
Reserve  System attractive.7  The  generally high nominal 
interest rates prevailing during  the 1970$ made require- 
ments particularly onerous and increased the incentive 
to surrender membership.  Negotiations to address 
these issues culminated in the Monetary Control Act of 
1980 (MCA). The act extended reserve requirements  to 
all depository institutions while allowing membership  to 
remain voluntary. It also lowered required reserve ratios 
to reduce the implicit  tax on member banks. 
Although the lower requirements helped to ease the 
effective tax on banks, the reduction was offset by the 
exceptionally high  interest rates that prevailed in the 
early  years of the 1980s. These rates raised the implicit 
tax, reducing potential earnings of many depositories 
and constraining their ability to pay competitive rates. 
Wide spreads between market rates and deposit rates 
encouraged depositors to move funds into instruments 
exempt from  reserve  requirements. The  Federal 
Reserve continued to ask for the right to pay interest on 
required reserve balances (in conjunction with allowing 
interest on demand deposits) but its appeals were not 
successful.8 During the eight-year phase-in period for 
the new reserve requirement  structure mandated  by the 
MCA,  there were only minimal  changes  to reserve 
requirements beyond those specified in the act. 
The role of requirements in money control was espe- 
cially important between 1979 and 1982 when the Fed 
was seeking to control  Mi  by adjusting nonborrowed 
reserves.9  Thereafter, as the Fed moved away from Ml 
control, the reserve-Mi linkage received less attention. 
Nevertheless, even now the linkage is used to forecast 
required reserves and banks' demand for reserves. 
The role of  required  reserves in bank liquidity 
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,  most 
analysts believed that an important function of required 
reserves was  providing  liquidity  to the banks. Most 
postwar  commentary  on reserve  requirements  has, 
however, downplayed  the idea. Many writers have 
'Both the Federal Reserve's  proposals for legislation and some 
alternative proposals appear in Miller. 'Proposals on Financial 
Institution Reserve Requirements." 
eSee statement by J. Charles Partee before the Subcommittee  on 
Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the 
House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs. October 
27, 1983, reported in the Federal Reserve  Bulletin. November 1983, 
pp. 850-51. 
To improve the linkage between reserves  and deposits, the Federal 
Reserve  did switch from tagged reserve accounting to  almost- 
contemporaneous reserve accounting, a change that was 
announced in 1982 but not put into effect until 1984. 
pointed out that if banks have to hold reserves to meet 
requirements, they cannot  simultaneously use those 
reserves to make loans  or handle  unexpected with- 
drawals.'0  That  conclusion is almost certainly appropri- 
ate when the object is to provide liquidity over time. 
Nonetheless, reserve balances do provide  a very 
important form of liquidity  for periods shorter than the 
time interval over which requirements must be met on 
average (one or two weeks in recent decades). These 
balances constitute a clearing mechanism for interbank 
check and wire transfers.  Far from being sterile bal- 
ances sitting idly at the Federal Reserve, as they are 
described in  many textbooks,  reserves actually  flow 
from one depository institution's  account to another's 
many times a  day. 
The short-run liquidity role of reserve requirements 
garnered some attention within  the Federal Reserve 
during the 1980s. At that time, the Fed was seeking an 
explanation  for  observed  increases  in  excess 
reserves." Understanding the importance of the Fed's 
findings requires a brief review of the composition and 
uses of required reserves.12 
Since 1959, banks have been able to satisfy  reserve 
requirements by holding vault cash and/or reserve bal- 
ances at the Federal Reserve. Beginning in 1968, the 
vault cash applied to meeting reserve requirements in 
the current period was the vault  cash  banks had held  in 
an earlier period. Consequently, vault cash could not 
play a role in meeting the banking system's marginal 
reserve requirements  once a reserve maintenance 
period began. Since the reserve requirement  restructur- 
ing of  the i980s, many depository institutions, including 
small commercial banks, thrifts, and  credit unions, have 
been able to meet their reserve requirement with vault 
cash  alone.  It does  not  appear,  however,  that the 
requirements determine  the institutions'  holdings of 
vault cash; instead, these institutions base their hold- 
ings on anticipated customer demands for currency and 
a strong preference not to be embarrassed by short- 
loBefore  the founding of  the Federal Reserve,  there was no regular 
mechanism to produce extra reserves to meet seasonal credit 
needs. Small banks kept part of their reserves in the form of 
deposits at large banks and used those reserves to meet their 
seasonal needs. The withdrawal of interbank deposits from the 
large cities actually extinguished reserves, forcing interest rates to 
climb sharply higher at those times. These liquidity problems have 
been widely discussed. See, for instance. Thomas Mayer.  James S. 
Duesenberry, and Robert Z. Aliber, Money, Banking, and the 
Economy, 3d ed. (New York:  W.W. Norton and Company. 1987), 
pp. 28-29. 
"The large volumes of daylight overdrafts also alerted the Federal 
Reserve  to some banks' heavy dependence on reserve balances for 
clearing activities. 
'The  following discussion draws heavily from Ann-Marie Meulendyke, 
"Monetary Policy Implementation and Reserve Requirements," 
internal working paper, September 1992, pp. 3-5. 
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more than meet their reserve requirements with vault 
cash  ("nonbound" institutions), reductions in  the level of 
the requirements are of no consequence.13 
Those medium and large depository institutions that 
do not cover their whole  requirement with vault cash 
("bound'  institutions) have to hold on average during 
each reserve maintenance period sufficient reserve bal- 
ances at the Federal Reserve to meet the remainder of 
their requirement (called  required reserve balances). 
But those reserve balances also serve as the means of 
payment for the clearing and settlement process. Any 
depository that does even a portion of its own clearing 
'3The Federal Reserve  excludes surplus vault cash from its measures 
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of checks or funds wires  has to maintain a reserve 
balance to facilitate that clearing. 
The volume of transactions executed each day using 
reserve accounts as a  means of payment has long been 
high relative to the balances held in the accounts. For 
many depositories,  reserve balances turn over  many 
times a day. That  turnover rate has  had an upward 
trend. The trend reflects cuts in reserve requirements 
that occurred between 1980 and 1984, and  again in 
1990  and 1992, and increases in the volume of  transac- 
tions  being processed by the Federal Reserve.14 Charts 
2 and 3 show recent patterns in these measures.15 The 
daily flows  have a large predictable component,  but 
'4Since 1980, depositories have been able to  establish required 
clearing balances to provide some reserve management  flexibility. 
These are additional reserve balances that depositories agree in 
advance to hold. In return, they receive credits to pay for priced 
Federal Reserve  services. The level of priced services used by a 
depository provides an effective maximum demand for required 
clearing balances. Required clearing balances were fairly small 
until after the 1990 cut in reserve  requirements,  when many large 
banks started to hold them. 
'Fedwire transactions have the largest impact on reserve balances, 
but other wire transfer operations and check processing 
transactions also lead to reserve transfers. These other transactions 
raise the turnover rate for reserve balances even further. 
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Requh'ed.  Balanóes 
Milons  of  dollars 
50,000 —  _____________ 
and Excess  Reserves 
Required reserve balances plus 
required clearing balances 








Systemwide Fedwire Activity 











___________  i  iii  I  !..IIIIHI  I  •11•1  111111  I  TilOillill 
L111111111I  II 
1il  I  I  I  I  ii  I1I1I1• 
HI  I 1.1  HI  11111  ' 
1980  82  84  86  88  90  92 
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30  FRBNY Quarterly Review/Autumn 1992 
84  85  86  87  88  89  90  91 
Note: All  figures  are  daily averages. considerable potential for surprise remains. The Fed- 
eral Reserve generally processes instructions to pay 
out reserve  balances even if  the  action puts the sending 
bank into overdraft. The  Fed imposes a penalty charge 
on any institution that ends the day overdrawn. Conse- 
quently, depository institutions have to aim for a signifi- 
cant positive end-of-day balance to minimize the risk of 
an inadvertent overdraft, regardless of their  reserve 
requirements. 
Depository institutions can deal with these additional 
precautionary  reserve  needs by  holding  excess 
reserves, but this strategy is costly since no interest is 
paid  on reserves.  When  required  reserve  balances 
declined in the early 1980s and again at the end of 
1990, depositories continued to try to minimize excess 
reserve holdings, but  they were restricted in their ability 
to do so. As noted below, if banks built up a cumulative 
excess reserve position early in  the period, either delib- 
erately or  because of an  unexpected reserve  inflow, 
they could be unable to work off the excess reserves 
without  risking  an  overnight overdraft if they experi- 
enced a reserve shortfall.  In trying to cope with the 
narrowing ranges of reserve balances that were accept- 
able in  the management  of  reserves,  depositories 
devoted considerable resources to monitoring internal 
reserve flows. In  the process, they  became less  tolerant 
of excess  reserves early in maintenance periods 
because of their diminished ability to work them off in 
subsequent days.  These developments restricted the 
depositories'  day-to-day  flexibility  in  managing 
reserves, caused more frequent unintended bulges in 
excess reserves, and added to end-of-day volatility  in 
the federal funds rate. 
Reserve requirements  in the  1950s and early 1960s 
At the time of the Treasury-Federal  Reserve Accord of 
1951, reserve requirement  ratios on demand deposits of 
Federal Reserve member banks were 24 percent for 
banks located in "central  reserve cities" (New York and 
Chicago), 20 percent  for  member banks  in  "reserve 
cities" (other cities with Federal  Reserve Banks or 
branches),  and 14 percent for "country  banks'  (the  term 
for all other member banks). The reserve ratio for time 
and savings deposits was 6 percent for member banks 
in all locations. 
During  the fifteen years  between 1951  and  1966, 
requirements were raised on five occasions and were 
lowered ten times.'° The changes in reserve require- 
IStReserve requirement ratios were changed for several reasons  over 
these years. Although many of the changes were undertaken to 
make reserves more or less Costly as part of the monetary policy 
process, changes were  also made to meet seasonal reserve 
demands and to implement the 1959 legislation aimed at equalizing 
reserve  ratios at central reserve and reserve city banks. In addition, 
ments were sometimes made in conjunction with com- 
plementary changes in the discount rate, while at other 
times the moves were made independently. Open mar- 
ket operations were used to cushion the changes in 
reserve requirements, so that hardly any of the immedi- 
ate impact of  the reserves released or absorbed was felt 
as a change in excess or borrowed reserves. 
In those years,  the Federal  Reserve formally 
described reserve requirements as a policy tool used to 
make reserves  more or less plentiful so as  to  alter  credit 
availability and money market interest rates—the near- 
term  policy  goals  of the time.'7  Its decisions  about 
reserve requirements  were, in practice, constrained by 
the exodus of small banks from the Federal Reserve 
System  in the 1950s.  Legislation passed in  1959 
addressed an  apparent  inequity between large and 
small banks in an attempt to make membership more 
attractive for the small banks. Country banks had lower 
nominal reserve requirements, but they often had to tie 
up relatively large sums in non-interest-earning reserve 
balances that did  not  serve  any other purpose.  (A 
reserve city bank generally handled payment clearing 
for them.) Because of their customer bases, most coun- 
try banks had to hold relatively high amounts of vault 
cash, but they could not use these holdings to satisfy 
requirements. The 1959 act permitted the Fed to count 
vault cash toward meeting reserve requirements. That 
change—implemented in three steps during 1959 and 
1960—reduced effective requirements, especially for 
country banks. It  was hoped that the  lower  requirements 
would encourage those banks to remain members of 
the Federal Reserve. 
Contemporary views of reserve requirements 
A commonly held view about reserve requirements  was 
expressed by a presidential commission appointed in 
1963 to study financial  institutions.  The commission 
concluded that "there is, within  broad limits, little basis 
for judging that in the long run one level [of reserve 
requirement  ratios] is preferable to another in terms of 
facilitating monetary policy."8 The  commission felt that 
the effects of requirements on bank earnings and Trea- 
sury revenues should be the primary factor considered 
in choosing reserve ratios. Although it saw the advan- 
Footnote 16 continued 
ratios were slightly moditied in 1966 when tranches were introduced 
for bolh demand and time deposits. At the same time, savings 
accounts were separated from time deposits for required reserve 
calculations. 
'7Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve  System. Annual Report, 
various years. 
'5Reporl of the Commitlee on Financial Institutions to the President  of 
the United Slates. Walter W. Heller, Chairman. Washington,  D.C.: 
Government  Printing Oftice. 1963, p. 12. 
FRBNY Quarterly Review/Autumn 1992  31 tages  to bank profitability of a significant cut, it believed 
that the cost to the Treasury would be too great. 
Some academic literature of the time offered other 
views on reserve requirements and monetary control. 
Several articles and books dealt with the concept of 
fractional reserve requirement ratios and described the 
strengths and weaknesses of  that structure. Tolley ana- 
lyzed  the tax  implicit  in reserve requirements.'9 He 
suggested that the level of reserve requirement ratios 
and hence of the amount of the tax had come about by 
accident. He then tried to establish a rationale for such 
a tax. He believed that under a gold standard, a system 
in which real resources had to be devoted to producing 
money, a fee was appropriate to encourage people to 
economize on the use of money. But when the cost of 
producing money is trivial, as it is with fiat money, the 
only justification for a charge is that the government 
could benefit from the  revenues arising from  the Federal 
Reserve's  provision  of reserves.  Tolley went on  to 
observe, however,  that the government's gains would 
cause misallocation of resources as banks took actions 
to reduce the effect of the tax. Such a distortion would 
argue  for very low reserve requirements. But Tolley 
thought very low requirements might make monetary 
control difficult because shifts between currency (which 
is effectively subject to a 100 percent reserve require- 
ment) and deposits would have a large impact on the 
amount of  money  created, as  would  mistakes  in 
estimating reserve provision. Hence he recommended 
that interest  be  paid  on  required  reserves  so that 
requirements would not need to be reduced. 
Friedman also discussed how shifts in preferences 
between currency and deposit holdings could ease or 
tighten  reserve conditions.2° He  reiterated the argu- 
ments from the 1930$ for 100 percent reserve require- 
ments.  Such requirements had  been proposed as a 
solution to the unpredictable multiplier effects of frac- 
tional reserve accounting arising from the differential 
treatment of deposits and currency. Friedman also rec- 
ognized  the undesirable  tax  effect of 100  percent 
requirements and described the inevitable incentive for 
money and credit provision to move outside the regu- 
lated  area  of  banking. To  combat that problem, he 
recommended paying interest on reserves. Later,  the 
Federal Reserve seriously considered the proposal to 
pay interest on reserves; it has periodically requested 
authority to do so from the Congress. 
laGeorge S.  Tolley,  Providing for Growth of the Money Supply," 
Journal o( Political Economy, December 1957. pp. 477-85. 
Milton Friedman, A Program lot  Monetary Stability (New York: 
Fordham University Press,  1959),  pp. 65-76. 
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Reserve requirements  in the latter part of the 1960s 
and 19705 
Reserve  requirements  continued to be raised and 
lowered to reinforce tightening or easing moves imple- 
mented with other  tools  during  the rest of the  1960s  and 
1970s. Requirements were increased four times and 
decreased seven times during these years.21 Sensitivity 
to the membership problem sometimes made the Fed- 
eral Reserve Board hesitant to raise requirements. On 
occasion, the  Board raised  them just on large time 
deposits—deposits mostly issued by the large banks, 
which were the least able to give up the services pro- 
vided by Fed membership. The combination of higher 
inflation and higher interest rates that emerged during 
these years drew increasing attention to the tax burden 
of reserve requirements and the related question  of 
differential treatment of member  and  nonmember 
banks. 
The Federal Reserve appointed a study group 
headed by Robert Black to review reserve requirement 
ratios.  The group  reported  its recommendations  in 
1966.22 The primary result of that study was the deci- 
sion  to move from near-contemporaneous  reserve 
requirements  with one-week reserve maintenance peri- 
ods for reserve city banks and two-week periods for 
country banks to weekly reserve periods for all member 
banks with a two-week lag between the computation 
and maintenance periods. This change was believed to 
make calculating requirements  easier for the banks and 
the New York Fed's Trading Desk.23 
Lagged reserve requirements weakened the  direct 
linkage between reserves and money, making it harder, 
in  theory, to manipulate reserves as a means of  control- 
ling money. For the most part, the Federal Reserve did 
not see any reason to be concerned because it was not 
attempting to control money in this way.  Instead, the 
Fed was attempting to affect money growth indirectly by 
influencing the demand for money. It altered the cost of 
obtaining reserves and hence the cost at which credit 
was provided.24 
2IThe count does not include the 1972 restructuring that raised 
requirements  for some banks and lowered them for others, as 
described later in the text. 
Robert P. Black, Report of  the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Reserve 
Proposals. May 13, 1966. 
The other change was to permit banks to carry forward reserve 
excesses up to 2 percent of required reserves for one reserve 
period. (Banks already had the authority to carry  forward 2 percent 
of reserve  deficiencies.) 
24LyIe E. Gramley and Samuel B. Chase, Jr., 'Time Deposits in 
Monetary Analysis," Federal Reserve  Bulletin. October 1965. 
pp. 1380-1404. In 1972, another Federal Reserve reform addressed 
the  problem  of  retaining  member  banks.  For  both 
reserve city and country  banks, reserve requirement 
ratios were to be graduated on the same schedule by 
volume of deposits. The change represented a signifi- 
cant cut  in  reserve requirements for small banks  in 
Federal Reserve cities and caused some large banks 
outside of Federal Reserve cities  to  face higher require- 
ments. The series of graduated steps in the required 
reserve  schedule  further weakened the relationship 
between required reserves and monetary deposits, an 
outcome that distressed those economists who wanted 
to see the Federal Reserve control reserves in order to 
control money growth. At  the time, the Federal Reserve 
was  targeting the federal funds rate and reserve 
requirements were lagged, so the concerns were not 
immediately relevant to operations.25 
Nonetheless, Federal Reserve  membership  con- 
tinued to decline. The Federal Reserve proposed pay- 
ing interest on  reserves on a couple of occasions in 
the 1970s to halt the decline, but the revenue loss to 
the Treasury  engendered  strong  congressional 
opposition.2° 
The Monetary  Control Act and reserve 
requirements  in the 1980s 
At the end of the  1970s,  the Federal Reserve once 
again tried to achieve universal membership.  Although 
it did  not literally accomplish  that,  it did  achieve, 
through the 1980  MCA, the most important goal associ- 
ated  with  expanded  membership:  the extension  of 
reserve requirements to all depository institutions. Fur- 
thermore, the Fed was permitted to collect  deposit data 
on an ongoing basis from all but the smallest deposito- 
ries, enabling  it to improve both estimates of actual 
money and forecasts of future money. Reserve require- 
ment ratios for member banks on transactions deposits 
were cut over a four-year period from a top rate of 16¼ 
percent to a top  rate of 12  percent. A low reserve 
tranche was also established of 3 percent on the first 
$25 million of deposits, with the amount of the tranche 
allowed  to rise over  time.27 Nonmember banks and 
thrifts that faced the  increases in requirements were 
Nonetheless, shortly afterwards the Federal Reserve  did take 
limited steps to use reserve targeting when it experimented with 
reserves on private deposits. See Meutendyke. "A Review  of Federal 
Reserve Policy Targets and Operating Guides" pp. 463-64. 
a6Specitic  proposals to pay interest on reserves were introduced in 
the Congress in 1977 and 1978. See Stuart E. Weiner,  Payment  of 
Interest on Reserves  Federal Reserve  Bank of Kansas City 
Economic Review  January  1985, pp. 20-21. 
27ln 1982. the Garn-St Germain Act modified the reserve requirement 
structure further to introduce a zero requirement  tranche. 
given an eight-year phase-in period to reach the final 
levels of requirements  specified in the act. The  Federal 
Reserve Board retained the option to adjust  reserve 
ratios within specified bands. 
The MCA was directed toward improving the Fed's 
ability to control money. It focused on deposits in Ml, 
the primary intermediate policy variable at the time. It 
did not, however, provide any scope for using reserves 
to control M2, a secondary target at the time the act 
was passed but the primary monetary target later in the 
decade. Money market mutual fund balances remained 
exempt, and the MCA actually took away from the Fed- 
eral Reserve the power to impose reserve requirements 
on personal time and savings deposits. 
Aside from the changes to reserve requirements  man- 
dated by the legislation, only minor modifications were 
made to reserve requirements  during the 1980s.2° 
Because the structure of requirements had  been set 
within specified limits by the MCA, it was generally felt 
that policy-related changes in the ratios would  have 
been difficult to implement during the eight-year phase- 
in period, so there was little point in considering them. 
Since the legislation had not given the Federal Reserve 
the option to pay interest on reserve balances, the 
Board might have  hesitated to raise  requirements 
because of the implied increase in the tax burden.29 
Furthermore, the Federal  Reserve believed  it could 
achieve its objectives just as well through open market 
operations and discount window policy. 
Excess reserve behavior  and  potential  problems  with 
reserve requirements 
The Federal Reserve saw increasing evidence during 
the 1980s that depository institutions were having diffi- 
culty managing  reserves.  These  observations  sug- 
gested that reserve requirements might be inadequate 
for smooth  monetary operations. Normal levels of 
excess reserves rose fairly steadily in the years follow- 
ing passage of the MCA. Some of the increase was the 
inevitable result of extending reserve requirements to 
nonmember  depository institutions.30  But member bank 
ln  March 1983, the Board eliminated reserve  requirements  on time 
deposits with an initial maturity of two and one-half years or more. 
In September 1983. it reduced the minimum maturity for exemption 
from requirements  to eighteen months. 
2The MCA did provide for payment of interest on supplemental 
reserve  requirements  under reslricted circumstances if such 
requirements  were needed for monetary control. The provision has 
not been used. 
3°At some point during the phase-in period, vault cash no longer met 
all of the larger nonmember  institutions' requirements, and they 
opened reserve accounts at the Federal Reserve.  Only then could 
these institutions have excess reserves. (Previously,  they may have 
had excess reserves  from their own perspective in the form of 
surplus vault cash and deposits at correspondents, but the Federal 
Reserve  does not count these in its reserve  measures.) 
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contrasted  with  their behavior during much of the 
1970s, when they  had generally hovered in  a  range near 
$200 million. The  search for explanations led to several 
discoveries.  It  was  observed  that excess  reserves 
tended to move inversely to required reserves not met 
by vault cash, both period to period and over time, as 
balances held at Federal  Reserve  Banks trended 
lower.31  The sharp drop in required reserve balances 
between  1980 and  1984 occurred  as lower reserve 
requirements were being phased in for member banks 
under MCA and the  spread of  automatic teller  machines 
was encouraging rapid expansion of  vault cash holdings 
(Chart 1). 
Average required reserve balances rose again in the 
next few  years, but excess  reserves continued to 
expand at member banks as well as at nonmember 
banks.  Conversations  with  officials at a number  of 
banks underscored the growing role of large payments 
flowing through their reserve accounts. The volume of 
wire transfers over Fedwire—the Federal Reserve's  wire 
transfer system—grew  rapidly (Chart 3),  making it 
increasingly difficult for banks to predict  reserve bal- 
ances. Since the Federal Reserve  penalized end-of-day 
overdrafts, banks had to be careful not to aim for too 
low a reserve balance  lest  an  unexpected late day 
outflow  (or an  expected receipt  that  did not arrive) 
should leave them overdrawn. These discoveries sug- 
gested that for a number of banks, reserve balances 
needed to meet requirements  were not very different in 
size from those needed to manage clearing and settle- 
ment and to avoid overdrafts. 
These factors were taken into account by the Federal 
Reserve in estimating the aggregate demand for excess 
reserves.32 But they did not lead to serious discussions 
of the  structure  of reserve requirements during the 
1980s. 
Cuts in reserve  requirements in the  1990s 
The  Federal Reserve Board eliminated reserve require- 
ments on nontransaction deposits at  the  end of  1990. In 
explaining its action, the Board indicated that the exist- 
ing structure had been designed "primarily to permit 
greater precision of monetary control when  policy 
focused on reserve aggregate targeting." It went on to 
describe the changing conditions that had prompted its 
move: 
'David  Jones,  Excess Reserves  under MCA," November 10. 1983, 
and David Small and Brian Madigan. "An Analysis of Excess 
Reserves,"  July 1, 1986, internal memoranda, Board of Governors  of 
the Federal Reserve  System. 
32Ann.Marie  Meulendyke. U.S. Monetary Policy and Financial 
Markets, Federal Reserve  Bank of New York,  1990, chap. 6. 
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In subsequent years, as the Federal  Reserve 
moved away from the procedures in effect in the 
early 1980s, which required a broad reserve base, 
reserve  requirements  on  nonpersonal  time 
accounts  have become  somewhat of an anach- 
ronism. Moreover,  the  current 3 percent require- 
ment  has placed depository institutions  at a 
disadvantage relative to other providers of credit, 
spawning efforts  to circumvent the requirement. 
The Board  took action at this time also  in 
response to mounting  evidence that commercial 
banks have been tightening their standards of  cred- 
itworthiness, [a development thatj has in recent 
months begun to exert a contractionary influence 
on the economy....  Lower reserve requirements at 
any given  level of money market interest rates will 
reduce costs to depository  institutions,  providing 
added incentive to lend to creditworthy borrowers. 
The reduction in reserve requirements boosted earn- 
ings for some depository institutions but, as indicated 
earlier, it had the undesirable side effect of complicating 
reserve management for many institutions. With lower 
routine levels of required reserve balances, their ability 
to accept reserve variability from day to day within a 
two-week reserve maintenance period without either 
incurring an expensive overdraft or being  stuck with 
unusable excess reserves was reduced. Depositories 
found they had to use considerable resources to hold 
down  excess  reserves. The action  also complicated 
operations of  the  Open Market Trading Desk at the New 
York Federal Reserve Bank, especially in the first few 
months of 1991? 
Relatively modest reserve  excesses often  inspired 
sharp declines in the federal funds rate, even on days 
that were not the ends of maintenance periods. Depos- 
itories had less ability to absorb and make use of the 
excess reserves because they could  not run large defi- 
ciencies in subsequent days without  ending overdrawn. 
When a number of depositories discovered toward the 
end of a  day  that  they had excess reserve positions and 
tried to sell the funds into the interbank federal funds 
market, their efforts  often pushed the funds rate down 
sharply, sometimes  almost to  zero. At that time of day, it 
is too late for open market operations to be undertaken 
to affect that day's reserves, since same day transfers 
of Treasury debt cannot  be arranged  after the  Fed's 
securities wire closes, officially at 2:30 p.m. eastern 
33Federal Reserve  Bulletin, February 1991. p. 95. 
See  "Monelary Policy and Open Market Operations during  1991," 
this Review,  Spring 1992. pp. 80-88. for a discussion of these 
developments  and a  description of their impact on the Desk's 
reserve management. time. Hence, depositories as a group could not elimi- 
nate the excesses except by repaying discount window 
loans. In 1991, routine borrowing from this source was 
already at very low levels, so little could be repaid. 
Low reserve balances also increased the likelihood of 
an incipient overdraft. Depositories that discovered  they 
were overdrawn late in the day generally tried to cover 
the overdrafts by borrowing in the federal funds market. 
If funds  were scarce systemwide, sufficient  reserves 
might not  be available. Depositories could obtain 
reserves from  the  discount window, but  in  the  early 
months  of 1991, many banks were unusually reluctant to 
borrow lest such a  step be read as a sign that they were 
in trouble. That reluctance to borrow often caused fed- 
eral funds to be bid to very high levels before some 
banks finally  turned to the window to  cover  the 
shortages.35 
The role of the discount window in policy 
implementation 
Like reserve requirements, the  discount window  has 
played a supporting role to open market operations in 
the monetary policy process. This section describes the 
guiding  principles  for discount  window borrowing.  It 
reviews the two main features of that borrowing, the 
rules that govern the use of the facility  and the rate  or 
rates that are charged. It  then provides a chronological 
review of developments in  the  behavior of borrowing 
from the 1950s to the present. 
The philosophy behind the discount window 
mechanism 
Federal Reserve views of the discount window's roles 
changed considerably between the founding of the Fed- 
35A series of papers prepared by the staff of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York after the 1990 Cut in required reserve ratios 
considers the operational difficulties of low required reserve  ratios 
and evaluates possible solutions. Overall, the papers suggest that 
the best solution to the reserve management  problems encountered 
with tow reserve balances would be to pay interest on reserves  so 
that requiremenls could  be increased without raising the costs  to 
depository  inslitutions. 
The collection of papers also evaluates other alternatives. A 
return to more routine use of the discount window would provide 
the  banking system  with valuable  flexibility, but  overcoming  the  current 
strong reluctance to  borrow  appears to be  a  difficult challenge. 
In the absence of such changes, only one of the other 
alternatives could  provide more than modest help to the reserve 
management process: permitting banks to end the day overdrawn. 
Nonetheless, permitting overdrafts would have significant draw- 
backs. If this approach were to be seriously considered, permitted 
overdrafts would have to be collaleralized and made subject to a 
modest charge. Even so, it seems to go against the thrust of 
efforts to reduce daylight overdrafts and could  be seen as  weaken- 
ing the essential discipline of a reserve  requirement  structure. 
Other approaches deserving consideration include expanding 
reserve carryovers and shortening the vault cash lag, variants of 
which have recently been introduced by the Board of Governors. 
These approaches, however,  would raise reserve  management 
flexibility only slightly. 
eral  Reserve in 1914  and the 1930s as open market 
operations gradually replaced discount window borrow- 
ing as the primary source of Federal Reserve credit. 
Then, between 1934 and 1950, the discount window fell 
into disuse, and there was little consideration of the 
roles of the window as a policy  tool. 
The Federal Reserve's concept of the policy role of 
the discount window was  reexamined after the 1951 
Accord and again in the latter half of the 1960s. Both 
studies led to some modifications in the rules for bor- 
rowing but did not change the underlying philosophy. 
Most of the rule changes since the early 1970s have 
been small and have addressed specific concerns. 
Since  the Accord,  the Federal  Reserve's discount 
window policy has discouraged persistent reliance on 
borrowing.  That stance has ensured that  borrowed 
reserves generally represent only a modest share of 
total reserves. The Fed believes that the discount  win- 
dow should serve as a  safety  valve, a  temporary source 
of reserves when they are not readily available from 
other sources.36 
The window in recent decades has been available to 
healthy banks for occasional, but not continuous, use.37 
Borrowing has been rationed through a variety  of means 
that  have encouraged a "reluctance to borrow." The 
degree of reluctance shown by the banks has varied 
considerably over the years, even in the absence of 
changes in the guidelines for borrowing. 
At  the same time, the Fed has counted on there being 
some amount of borrowing because borrowing is  an 
element in the reserve adjustment process. In this con- 
text,  the window  has  played a vital role in  meeting 
unexpected reserve needs. Various open market oper- 
ating procedures depend on some degree of stability  in 
the banks'  demand for  borrowed  reserves,  but the 
administrative guidelines and changing bank attitudes 
have made this stability  difficult to achieve. For much of 
the  time since  the  mid-1960s, the discount  rate  has 
been below competing market rates, in particular  the 
overnight federal funds rate. Consequently, administra- 
tive restrictions rather than the rate have had the big- 
gest role  in  limiting the amount of borrowing. Banks 
have responded to the profit incentive to borrow, but in 
doing  so they have had to factor  in  some nonprice 
costs—such as potential loss of future access to the 
window—that are difficult to estimate. 
During the 1980s,  increasing financial difficulties and 
36All borrowing from the Federal Reserve  must be fully collateralized. 
At times, the Fed also provides extended credit at market-based 
rates to banks whose financial difficulties  have  cut them off from 
regular sources of financing. Banks using the facility musl wo'ik 
with their regulators toward a solution. That type of borrowing is not 
a monetary policy tool, and thus is not a focus of this piece. 
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—I bank failures led banks to become more reluctant to 
borrow, even under conditions that would formerly have 
led them to use the window. The rise in banking crises 
made many banks fearful  that if they borrowed, rumors 
that they were in  financial trouble would arise. Thus, the 
demand for borrowing became even less predictable, 
reducing the value of the relationship between borrow- 
ing and the spread between the federal funds rate and 
the discount rate that  was  exploited  in the  policy 
process. 
The direct cost represented by the rate charged for 
discount window borrowing has also played some role 
in the policy process. Changes in the rate have nor- 
mally attracted general attention to the state of mone- 
tary policy, giving  rate changes the potential for an 
announcement effect. The  extent of the announcement 
effect has varied over time, depending on the verbal 
message given with the rate change and the way bor- 
rowing was being used in carrying out policy. Some- 
times  the Fed has sought to  signal policy changes when 
it  changed the rate. At other times it deliberately down- 
played the significance of the move. 
Changes in  the discount rate  are voted by the Boards 
of Directors of the twelve Federal Reserve Banks and 
approved by the Board of Governors. The governors 
generally approve changes in the rate when they want 
to signal  a change  in  the  stance of policy or  when 
market rates have moved significantly away from the 
discount rate, so that the discount rate is "catching up" 
with the changes. Rate changes have normally comple- 
mented the guidelines established by the FOMC  for the 
conduct of open market operations. 
The discount rate per se has not, in the post-Accord 
period, been regarded as a primary means of influenc- 
ing the amount of discount window borrowing. Indeed, 
because  short-term interest rates have  frequently 
exceeded the discount rate since the mid-I 960s, ration- 
ing of the use of the window has had to be  accom- 
plished through means other  than the rate. There have 
been numerous recommendations over the years that 
the rate be given the primary role in rationing credit, 
either because the approach was more straightforward 
and  less arbitrary than rationing administratively  or 
because the use of a below-market rate implied a sub- 
sidy. The specifics of the relationship between the dis- 
count rate and open market policy changed modestly 
when  the techniques  of policy implementation  were 
changed but have consistently relied on administered 
disincentives to borrow. 
The discount window in the  1950s through the 
mld-1960s 
Borrowing jumped  dramatically in the early  1950s.  It 
rose from an average of $130 million  in  1950 to an 
36  FABNY Quarterly Review/Autumn 1992 
average of $800 million in 1952. By December 1952, it 
had reached $1.6 billion. Interest rates rose after the 
Accord, and the discount rate lagged behind. (Chart 4 
shows  borrowed  reserves and their share  of total 
reserves between 1950 and 1965, along with the dis- 
count  rate and short-term  interest  rates.) The cost 
structure made borrowing attractive for the first time 
since the early 1930s. An excess profits tax instituted in 
1951 increased the incentive to use the discount window 
because borrowings served as an offset in computing 
the tax. 
A Federal Reserve System committee  was estab- 
lished in 1953 to examine the history  of the rationales 
for borrowing. The  committee concluded that the estab- 
lished "tradition  against borrowing" should be encour- 
aged  because  it contributed to the soundness of 
individual banks and the banking system. The com- 
mittee report served as the basis of the 1955 revisions 
to Regulation A, the regulation governing use of the 
window.39 
The report observed that the founders of the Federal 
Reserve had expected the discount window to be the 
primary source of Federal Reserve credit. In the early 
years of the Federal Reserve, many member banks 
borrowed a substantial  portion  of the reserves they 
needed from the window; indeed, it was not unusual for 
a bank to borrow continuously. By contrast, in the years 
before the founding of  the Federal Reserve, a bank that 
was heavily dependent on borrowed funds, rather than 
on its own capital and deposits,  was believed to be 
more vulnerable to failure. 
The committee noted that the development of open 
market operations during the 1920s as an alternative 
source of Federal Reserve credit made possible a  grad- 
ual move to discourage heavy borrowing. Once again, 
banks that borrowed persistently came to be seen as 
more likely to fail, and this view was reinforced during 
the early 1930s when the  number of bank failures 
soared. Mindful of  this negative image, the banks them- 
selves became reluctant to borrow and instead built up 
holdings of  excess reserves  during the latter  part of the 
1930s. This course of action was simplified by the mon- 
etization of  the  vast gold inflows inspired by the revalua- 
tion of gold  in  1934 and  by the approach of war in 
Europe in the latter years of the decade.4° 
By the early 1950s, however, a decade and a half  with 
low numbers of bank failures had apparently reduced 
the banks' own reluctance to borrow to such an extent 
System Committee on the Discount and Discount Rate Mechanism. 
"Report on the Discount Mechanism," March 12. 1954. 
3eFederal Reserve  Bulletin, January 1955, PP. 8-14. 
4°Meutendyke.  U.S. Monetary Policy and Financial Markets, chap. 2. that many banks were inclined to return to the window 
when doing so became profitable. The committee felt 
this behavior should be discouraged. It reiterated the 
belief that a bank that used its own resources to meet 
increased demands for credit was healthier than one 
that was dependent on borrowed funds.  In its  1954 
Chart  4 
report, the committee recommended  that  routine 
reserve  provision be accomplished  almost entirely 
through open market operations. The report also rec- 
ommended  limiting the term  of  borrowing to fifteen days 
under normal circumstances. It noted that most banks 
had emerged from the war with substantial portfolios of 
Borrowed Reserves and  Selected Interest Rates, 1950-65 
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tional  funds for seasonal or other  purposes. The regula- 
tions that were subsequently adopted guided discount 
officers in distinguishing  between "appropriate"  and 
"inappropriate"  borrowing. Borrowing was considered 
inappropriate when the funds were  used for  normal 
business activities. In particular, the committee disap- 
proved of  borrowing to  profit  from  interest  rate 
differentials. 
The  role of the  discount window during the rest of the 
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1968  67  68  69  70  71  72  73  74  75  76  77  78  79 1950s and early 1960s generally followed the pattern 
set out by the committee's guidelines. There was some 
debate about whether the reluctance to borrow was 
motivated  by the banks  own caution or by Federal 
Reserve restrictions.  Some banks almost  never bor- 
rowed,  suggesting an internally generated reluctance. 
Many banks, however,  apparently took account of the 
full cost of borrowing, including potential loss of future 
access, and borrowed when it was profitable. In that 
context, borrowing was rarely a large bargain. In fact, 
the discount rate was often slightly above short-term 
Treasury  bill rates,  although both borrowing and the 
incentive to borrow varied cyclically. Normally, borrow- 
ing was only a modest share of total Federal Reserve 
credit. 
The Board of Governors approved periodic  adjust- 
ments to the discount rate and issued a statement of 
purpose with each adjustment. Often the changes lag- 
ged market rates, and the Board explained its action as 
an effort to catch  up with market rates.  When  the 
discount rate was low relative to other  short-term rates, 
borrowing  often rose. (The primary alternative rate  was 
the Treasury bill rate in the 1950s; the federal funds 
market grew in importance during the 1960s.) 
Some academic economists criticized the discount 
mechanism. They did not like the fact that banks were 
given mixed signals about borrowing, with the relatively 
low discount rate often encouraging use of the window 
while the administrative guidelines were  discouraging it. 
They felt  that the rules  made it difficult to  judge whether 
policy was tight or easy.41 The  authors preferred a rate 
that was set above market rates—a penalty rate—but 
urged that no administrative restrictions be placed on 
borrowing. 
Discount window policy in the late 1960s and 1970s 
Higher  interest rate levels in the latter half  of  the 1960s, 
especially the "tight money" episode of 1966, encour- 
aged  more borrowing (Chart  5). The  decline in member- 
ship was  also garnering attention, and there was 
concern that the discount window was not sufficiently 
available to small member banks. A series of studies 
were undertaken during the late 1960s under the guid- 
ance of a steering committee of Federal Reserve  Gover- 
nors and Presidents.42 The  studies reviewed the history 
of the discount mechanism, compared  the discount  win- 
4tsee Friedman, A Program for  Monetary Stability, pp. 38-41; A. 
James  Meigs, Free Reserves  and the Money Supply (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.  1962);  and Warren Smith. "The 
Discount Rate as a Credit-Control Weapon." Journal of Political 
Economy,  April 1958, PP.  171-77. 
42Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve  System,  Reappraisal  of 
the Federal Reserve  Discount Mechanism. 1971. 
dow with the tools and techniques of foreign central 
banks, evaluated some of its problems, and presented 
several possible reforms.  The steering committee 
endorsed the practice  of permitting  banks to borrow 
only intermittently. It wanted to continue the administra- 
tive disincentives to frequent borrowing, but it was trou- 
bled that some banks seemed to get little or no benefit 
from the window. The summary report  recommended 
some changes to make  borrowing more convenient, 
especially  for small  unit banks  with  large seasonal 
swings  in loan demand  and  limited  access  to the 
national credit markets. The report's recommendation  of 
a special seasonal borrowing privilege for small mem- 
ber banks was adopted in 1973 and remains in effect, 
although  it has  been  modified  somewhat in recent 
years.43 
The report also proposed that one form  of adjustment 
credit should consist of a basic borrowing privilege that 
would give all (member) banks some access at reason- 
able cost to Federal Reserve  credit based on published 
guidelines for amount and frequency of borrowing. Even 
the proposed basic borrowing privilege did not envision 
continuous  borrowing;  if a bank  needed additional 
credit, its borrowing would be subjected to  scrutiny. The 
approach was not adopted, although the proposed fre- 
quency schedule did influence the informal guidelines 
used  by the discount officers in  subsequent  years. 
Finally, the study brought to light considerable inconsis- 
tencies in the administration of  the window by the differ- 
ent  Federal  Reserve  Banks.  Efforts were  made  to 
improve coordination in order to minimize those 
differences. 
During the 1970s, Federal Reserve monetary policy 
focused on adjusting the federal funds rate to respond 
to deviations in money growth from  desired ranges. The 
discount window generally played a subsidiary role in 
the process.44 Changes in the discount rate  were often 
motivated by changes in  market rates, as they had been 
43The seasonal borrowing privilege was extended to nonrnember 
banks under the MCA. In 1992, the Board began charging a market 
rate on seasonal borrowing tied to the federal funds rate and 
certificate of deposit rates. 
Economists have debated the importance of the discount rate as a 
mechanism for changing policy. Sometimes Federal Reserve 
announcements  indicated that the rate was changed to catch up 
with market rates. At other times they cited monetary policy 
concerns. At issue is  whether these announcements  had an impact 
beyond that of open market operations. See Timothy Cook and 
Thomas Hahn, "The Information Content of Discount Rate 
Announcements  and Their Effect on Market Interest Rates," Journal 
of Money,  Credit, and Banking, vol. 20. no. 2 (May 1988), 
pp. 168-80; Raymond E. Lornbra and Raymond G. Torto, "Discount 
Rate Changes and Announcement  Effects," Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, February 1977, pp. 171-76; and Daniel L. Thornton, 
"The Market's Reaction  To Discount Changes: What's Behind The 
Announcement  Effect?" Federal Reserve  Bank of St. Louis, Working 
Paper Series, November 1991. pp. 2-23. 
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intended  to create an  announcement  effect.45 The 
amount of borrowing generally increased as the  federal 
funds rate rose relative to the discount rate, a relation- 
ship that su.ggested  that banks were seeking to max- 
imize profits  through  their borrowing decisions.  The 
Open Market Trading Desk took that relationship into 
account  when choosing how many  nonborrowed 
reserves to provide, since the amount of desired bor- 
rowing affected the reserve levels consistent with the 
desired funds rate. 
Relation  between discount policy and reserve 
targeting from 1979 to 1982 
Borrowing took on increased importance after  the Octo- 
ber 1979 changes  to reserve operating  procedures. 
Under the new procedures, the Trading Desk provided 
only the level of nonborrowed reserves estimated to be 
consistent  with targeted  Ml.  If depositories  needed 
additional reserves to meet their requirements  because 
Ml was above target,  they  would have  to  borrow them at 
the discount window. In practice, the system was struc- 
tured so that there was some borrowing even when Ml 
was on target. Only when Ml was far below target for a 
while  in 1980  was borrowing allowed to drop to frictional 
levels, leading the federal funds rate to fall below the 
discount rate. 
The  adjustment mechanism depended heavily on the 
enforced reluctance to borrow.  When banks borrowed  to 
satisfy  their reserve  requirement, they reduced their 
future access to the discount window. Consequently, 
when the banking system as a whole had to borrow a 
higher  volume of reserves to meet requirements, indi- 
vidual banks would bid up the  federal funds rate as  they 
tried to avoid being one of the banks that  turned to the 
window. The process gave banks the message to cut 
back on deposit-expanding activities. Chart 6 gives key 
borrowing and interest rate relationships during these 
years. 
The move to the new procedures inspired discussion 
of the appropriate guidelines for setting and changing 
the discount rate. Some Board members initially had 
expected that the discount rate  would be changed more 
frequently than before to keep it more closely aligned 
with market rates.  In practice, the basic discount rate 
was changed fairly frequently—sixteen times between 
October  1979 and  October  1982—but it still  moved 
much less than the funds rate. At  times, unprecedented 
weekly average spreads developed between the funds 
rate and the discount rate. 
451n November 1978, reserve requirements,  the discount rate, and the 
funds rate target were all raised simultaneously  as a dramatic 
gesture to attack the rising  rate of inflation and the weakening 
exchange value of the dollar. 
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During two periods of exceptionally restrictive provi- 
sion of nonborrowed reserves, in 1980 and  again in 
1981, the volume of borrowing ran very  high. The  Board 
Chart 6 
Borrowed  Reserves and  Selected Interest  Rates, 
1979-82 
Percent 
Notes: Borrowed reserves are quarterly averages.  Federal 
funds  are  monthly averages.  Discount rates  are actual rates 
announced by  the Federal  Reserve Bank  of  New  York. 
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1979  1980  1981  1982 introduced a surcharge on frequent borrowing by large 
banks as part of the Administration's credit  restraint 
program in March  1980.46 The frequency  limits for 
access at the basic rate  were similar to those that had 
been  proposed a decade earlier  for the basic borrowing 
privilege.  In addition,  banks  did not  have unlimited 
access  to  the  discount window even when they paid the 
surcharge. The funds  rate often  exceeded even the 
combined  basic rate and surcharge—which reached a 
high of 18 percent in 1981. 
Borrowed reserve targeting in the l9BOs and 
early 1990$ 
Borrowed reserve targeting replaced nonborrowed 
reserve targeting in  1983 as the primary guide  for 
choosing  desired reserve levels. The shift in emphasis 
removed the automatic linkage between reserves and 
money targets. Borrowed reserve targeting made more 
formal use of the relationship between the amount of 
borrowing and the spread of the federal funds rate  over 
the discount rate that arises from the  restrictions on 
heavy use of the discount window. As was the case 
under the previous procedures, forcing increased bor- 
rowing tended to lead banks to bid up the  federal funds 
rate relative to the discount rate as they sought to avoid 
having to borrow. Reduced borrowing encouraged less 
aggressive bidding for federal funds, and the rate would 
fall. The FOMC raised borrowed  reserve objectives 
when it  wanted to  tighten policy and lowered  them when 
it wanted to ease policy.48 Chart 7 shows key borrowing 
and rate relationships during these years. 
A change in the discount rate was viewed as a sub- 
stitute  for a  change in the  borrowing assumption. When- 
ever the discount rate  was raised or lowered, the FOMC 
made an explicit decision whether that action by itself 
accomplished  the desired policy adjustment. On some 
occasions, the amount of assumed borrowing was left 
unchanged  so that  the average federal funds rate  would 
41A more detailed discussion of the rationale underlying the program 
of credit restraint is given in a statement by Frederick H. Schultz. 
Vice Chairman, Board of Governors  of the Federal Reserve  System, 
betore the Subcommittee on Access to Equity Capital and Business 
Opportunities of the House Committee on Small Business. April  2, 
1980. II is reprinted in the Federal Reserve  Bulletin, April 1980. 
41The surcharge was initially imposed in March 1980. II was then 
removed  in May of that  year. only to be reimposed in September.  In 
1981. the surcharge underwent further changes. It was increased in 
May. reduced in September, reduced again in October, and finally 
eliminated in November. 
4Marvin Goodfriend. "Discount Window Borrowing, Monetary Policy. 
and the Post-October  6, 1979 Federal Reserve  Operating 
Procedure."  Journal of  Monetary Economics. September 1983, 
pp. 343-56, otters a critique of that relationship and suggests that 
it will inevitably be unreliable. 
be expected to rise or fall by the same amount as the 
discount rate. At other times, the borrowing allowance 
was changed in a direction that lessened the impact of 
the discount rate change.  For  example, the  FOMC 
would raise the borrowing assumption when the dis- 
count rate was lowered so that the average funds rate 
would fall by less than the discount rate. 
Increased reluctance to borrow  in the 1980s  and 
early 1990s 
A series of banking órises  and failures beginning in 
1982 reintroduced  a source of reluctance to borrow that 
had largely disappeared after the 1930s. Once again, 
banks became concerned that borrowing at the  dis- 
count window might be interpreted as a sign that they 
were so weakened  financially that  they could not borrow 
funds from normal sources. The  concern was especially 
high in 1984, when Continental Illinois National Bank 
suffered a crisis of confidence, experienced runs by its 
large depositors,  and was forced  to borrow  massive 
amounts from the Federal Reserve to keep operating. 
Continental's  experience made many other  banks more 
hesitant to borrow,  and wider spreads of the funds rate 
over the discount rate emerged for a given amount of 
borrowing fostered by the Federal Reserve. As more 
banking crises developed and then were resolved, the 
reluctance to borrow became alternately more and less 
severe, but it never returned to its pre-1984 pattern. 
By the  fall of 1987, the borrowing relationship became 
sufficiently uncertain that  the Federal Reserve felt com- 
pelled to reduce its reliance on it as a guide to policy. 
Since that time, the Fed has given greater weight to 
indicators of money market conditions such as the fed- 
eral funds rate. Nonetheless, the extreme reluctance to 
borrow and the resulting uncertainty about how banks 
will respond to changing levels of reserve availability 
have also introduced some volatility to the funds rate. 
When banks  have not  wanted to borrow, they have 
reacted to a reserve shortage by bidding up the funds 
rate to very high levels before they finally turn to the 
discount window. Indeed, on one occasion in 1990, the 
funds rate reached 100 percent, a level not seen even 
when interest rates and borrowing levels were routinely 
much higher a decade earlier. Although efforts have 
been made to explain to the banks and the public that 
occasional borrowing is an appropriate action to relieve 
temporary shortages of reserves, the message has so 
far had limited impact. 
The reluctance to borrow has compounded  the 
reserve management difficulties  associated with low 
reserve requirements, described in the previous sec- 
tion. The low requirements  reduced depositories' ability 
to handle normal day-to-day variation in reserve flows 
because the range of reserve levels that fell between 
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reluctance to borrow weakened one means for banks to 
recover from an unexpected reserve shortage. 
Conclusions 
Required reserves and the discount  window can be 
Chart  7 
important supplements to open market operations in 
implementing monetary policy. Open market operations 
function  more smoothly when  both required reserves 
and the discount window are used in ways that contrib- 
ute to a stable and predictable demand for reserves. 
The difficulties in managing  reserves  that arose  in 
Borrowed Reserves and Selected Interest  Rates, 1983-92 
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89  90  91  92 recent years when these two tools  were not functioning 
as intended underscored their potential value. 
Required reserve ratios have fallen substantially on 
balance over the last four decades, primarily because 
untenable distortions arose from the implicit tax associ- 
ated with relatively high requirements  on which no  inter- 
est was paid. The  decline in ratios has been dramatic— 
from a top rate of 24 percent in 1951 to a top rate of 
10 percent today. Furthermore, vault cash now meets 
over half of requirements, in contrast to 1951 when it 
could not be used for that purpose. Thus, required re- 
serve balances are now only slightly above 1951 levels 
despite a sevenfold increase in checkable deposits. 
Although the reductions in distortions associated with 
the declining reserve requirement tax have been helpful 
to the functioning of  the banking system, the recent low 
levels of  required reserve balances relative to the needs 
of the banks for clearing and settlement purposes have 
reduced the stability  of the demand for reserves. Thus, 
policymakers must continue to balance conflicting con- 
siderations in  choosing the appropriate leve' of  required 
reserves. 
The  discount window has, overall, been a useful tool 
of monetary policy since the Accord.  It has  supple- 
mented open market operations as a  source of  reserves 
and provided flexibility to handle reserve shortages late 
in the day when open market operations are not feasi- 
ble. The Federal Reserve has found some amount of 
discount window borrowing  helpful  in  regulating  the 
availability of reserves on the margin. Nonetheless, the 
Fed has discouraged the banks from becoming heavily 
dependent on borrowed reserves. Administered limita- 
tions on borrowing have offset the influence of discount 
rates that were generally below market rates, ensuring 
that the discount window would  not become a major 
source of total reserves. 
Recently,  in the wake of a number of bank failures, 
the reluctance to borrow has been reinforced by banks' 
worries that their reputations could be tarnished if they 
were seen  as needing credit from the window. As a 
result, the discount window has been less useful as an 
adjunct to open market operations because the banks' 
borrowing patterns have become less  dependable. Until 
general confidence in the banking system is  restored— 
a process that is under way but far from complete—the 
discount window's  value to the policy process is likely to 
remain diminished and open market operations will suf- 
fer reduced flexibility. 
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